Whereas the former has voiced concern over UCAV sales for fear of how they will be employed, China (Israel equally less self-restrained) has demonstrated markedly shallow reserve in branding their weapons systems as the ideal instruments to be used for domestic security purpose, whether that means within state operations or asymmetric conflict beyond state borders. US restrictions on the sale of its MQ-9 Reaper UCAV, as a result of the convention arms transfers (CAT) policy, supports China’s expanding sales. For instance, not only are these drones inexpensive to acquire and operate, they perform well for state needs, undertaking and fulfilling intelligence gathering on the battlefield, tracking and surveillance, border patrol, and counter-narco-criminal activity and counter-terrorism (Wing Loong I – Chengdu Pterodactyl suits the surveillance role well), and engagements with small and dexterous targets in a variety of battle environments. This is due in part to their attractive price tag as well as their ability to fill an immediate need and desire on the part of purchasing states that face immediate security challenges. Lighter, cheaper, and less-reliable than its United States (US) “equivalents,” China’s integrated multi-role, multi-performance drones have been successful in assuming a large share of the global drone market. China simultaneously continues to extend its systems capabilities, adding to the attractiveness of its armed drone products sold to other countries. In addition to its existing arsenal of drones containing the easy-to-build CH-3 and CH-4, and the popular Wing Loong I and Wing Loong II (and variants) drones, China tested its first stealth drone, named the Li-Jian (“Sharp Sword”) in late 2013. Primarily sold as instruments of states’ security policies, the autonomous weapons systems have been the primary instruments of attacks in the MENA and near-MENA regions: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, UAE, Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Zambia, Pakistan, and Turkmenistan, among others. Chinese companies, notably Ziyan, have since turned to exporting its new Blowfish series autonomous armed helicopter (vertical take-off and landing, VTOL) drone to states across the MENA region. This initial thrust in drone sales was followed by the establishment of Chinese-operated factories in the Middle East and other regions, including South East Asia. Additionally, the Wing Loong I proved ideal for MENA states given the persistence of local rebel force activity and government desire for swift and effective response. At the time, the Chang Hong-3 (CH-3) and longer CH-4 “Rainbow” UCAVs, China’s less-expensive but relatively lower-quality combat drones as compared to its MQ-9 Reaper UCAV knock-off, were particularly attractive products. Three years ago, the Middle East proved to be a lucrative market for autonomous weapons systems and armed drones for Chinese military contractors. Today, approximately 30 countries are known to have operational armed drones, the proliferation of which has been decidedly facilitated by China’s eagerness to sell to essentially any state that is willing to buy them. Only several countries were able to boast the possession of “unmanned” aerial vehicles (UCAVs) or armed drones between 20, but that number has risen steadily since.
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